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Abstract  
This paper provides a longitudinal, critical overview of woodfuel interventions in Kano and 
northern dryland Nigeria.  Woodfuel still accounts for up to two-thirds of energy consumption, yet 
fuelwood-related issues are often ‘by-products’ of ‘higher priority’ energy-environment-
development preoccupations.  We suggest that energy policy has historically reflected 
preoccupations dominated by fossil fuel and new and renewable energy concerns, thereby raising 
questions about whether and to what extent such interventions reflect a desire to address woodfuel 
in its own right.  The paper adopts a selective critique of some foundational assumptions about the 
energy–poverty–development nexus, notably in relation to energy transition theory and practice, to 
explain such outcomes and their practical and policy implications.  In doing so, the analysis places 
particular emphasis on context, to demonstrate why the role of ‘situatedness’ must be better 
appreciated in energy circles and, equally importantly, acted upon during woodfuel interventions.  
More meaningful interventions, the paper concludes, should be based less on insights deriving from 
generic (wood) energy systems, hierarchies and relations, and considerably more on the lessons to 
be learned from the dynamic and complex realities of actual (wood) energy practices, networks and 
economies.  In this, as in much else, context remains key. 
 
1. Introduction 
Although Nigeria has a long-established status as a major oil producing and exporting country, 
successive governments have been unable to ‘ensure [an] optimal, adequate, reliable and secure 
supply of energy to, and its efficient utilization in, the country’ (ECN, 2007: 3). And yet energy is 
indispensable for the realisation of key policy goals and development targets. The Renewable 
Energy & Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP), for example, is unequivocal in identifying the 
lack of a stable energy supply as a major obstacle to Nigeria’s aspiration of becoming a modern 
economy and industrial nation by 2015, and within the top 20 global economies by 2020 (REEEP, 
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undated). The effects of enduring energy problems have further included: the disruption of 
individual and group livelihoods; threats to environmental sustainability; and constrained economic 
growth and diversification. All of these energy challenges have played a role in condemning 
significant numbers of Nigerians to a daily existence of material and energy poverty.  
 
Here, as elsewhere in the West African sub-region, the inability to adequately satisfy energy needs 
and demand is tantamount to a failure, both literally and metaphorically, to ‘energise’ society and 
nature (ECOWAS/UEMOA, 2006).1 This is of particular interest, given the plethora of energy 
interventions which have been recorded or proposed to date. These range from local projects to 
international programmes and policies (Sambo, 2005), some of which have their origins in the 
colonial era and even earlier (Cline-Cole, 1994). These interventions, regardless of what form they 
take, aim to better equip Nigerian society to meet the challenges of its varied, interlinked and 
evolving energy economies and systems, and, ultimately, to achieve specific development 
objectives (Sambo, 2009). It is little wonder then that their seemingly limited impact continues to 
attract policy and academic attention (Silviconsult, 1990/91; UNDP/World Bank, 1993), most 
commonly in the hope of learning lessons ‘to improve ongoing and future energy interventions’ 
(van Sambeek, 2007: 3). This paper aims to contribute to this ongoing debate, by reflecting on the 
ineffectiveness of wood energy interventions, notably policy, with particular reference to Kano and 
dryland northern Nigeria more generally.2  
 
Not only is Kano northern Nigeria’s most populous state, but its eponymous capital is the region’s 
largest metropolitan centre, its most important industrial/manufacturing and commercial hub and, 
arguably, its most diversified energy market (Figure 1). In addition, metropolitan Kano and its 
                                                          
1 The expression ‘to energise’ is used in Nigeria to mean ‘switching on’ or ‘operating’ an appliance or 
piece of equipment (cooker, lighting, generator, stove, iron, etc.) by powering it with non-human energy 
(electricity, gas, wood, diesel, charcoal, etc.). 
2 See http://deafrica.net/Reports/Catalogue%20Synthesis%20Report.pdf  
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extensive and densely-populated hinterland together contain the largest and most spatially-
concentrated regional woodfuel consuming population and, therefore, market. The history of  
Kano’s long-established biomass energy economies, markets and networks, on the one hand, and 
its long-standing tradition of woodfuel-related interventions, on the other, are well documented 
(Cline-Cole, 1994; Mortimore, 1972; Silviconsult, 1991). Equally, Kano’s contemporary woodfuel 
structures, dynamics and impacts are the subject of wider ongoing debates, that concern not only 
the place of woodfuel in individual and group livelihood strategies (Cline-Cole, 1998; 2006; 
Maconachie et al, 2009), but also the implication of fuelwood in wider nature-society interactions, 
including its link to deforestation, desertification, climate change and dryland development 
(Maconachie, 2007; Mortimore and Adams, 1999). It is within these debates that this paper, and 
the research upon which it is based, are situated.  
 
 
Figure 1: Urban Kano and Hinterlands 
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The failure to locate local voices in wood energy interventions is, of course, a reoccurring theme 
in many African countries. For example, in cataloguing rural energy interventions in Tanzania, the 
Hifab /TaTEDO Consultant Consortium noted in an observation that ‘[a] common 
denominator…was that [the government] addressed energy as a problem or a “crisis”, often without 
assessing the perceptions of the people who were supposed to suffer from this 
crisis’(Hifab/TaTEDO, 1998:1). In dryland Nigeria, this has arguably been as true of policy as of 
practice; as relevant in the case of programmes as of projects; and as applicable to ‘traditional’ as 
to ‘modern’ fuels (Cline-Cole, 1998). Thus wood energy interventions here have tended to 
consistently react to, rather than forestall perceived crises; and have routinely sought to both reduce 
consumption of, and stimulate substitution away from more ‘traditional’ sources of fuel, such as 
wood and charcoal. Indeed, fuelwood and charcoal-related interventions have often emerged as by-
products of other seemingly higher priority energy-environment preoccupations and interventions. 
In this vein, this paper aims to stimulate discussion about whether and why woodfuel interventions 
can be seen as possible contributors to a worsening of Nigeria's enduring and far-reaching energy 
crises, which they are intended to help alleviate or respond to in the first place.  
 
As with development interventions more broadly, the potential of energy interventions to achieve 
desired outcomes depends largely on whether they represent the ‘product of ideological fantasy or 
of a realistic acknowledgement of particular economies and historical experience’ (Cramer, 2006: 
245). Against this background, the discussion to follow is based on three main preliminary 
assumptions: 1) regardless of what form they take, energy interventions reflect the myriad of 
structural and other influences which have gone into their conception, as well as the agency which 
has mediated their implementation at all levels; 2) along with development interventions in general, 
they are the outcome of complex spatio-temporal and structural processes of contestation, 
competition and collaboration; and 3) taken together, the foregoing renders the situatedness and 
context of such interventions at least as important as their content and outcomes. 
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Building on these assumptions, the paper provides the beginnings of a case for the role of 
situatedness and context to be sufficiently widely appreciated, and acted upon in energy circles, 
with particular reference to woodfuel intervention. It does not, however, compile a catalogue of 
energy interventions; and still less is it an energy impact study or a monitoring and evaluation 
document. What the paper aspires to is, first, to serve as reminder that energy interventions are the 
outcome of complex and diverse processes of resistance, negotiation and contestation, often with 
unintended consequences for both nature and society. Second, the arguments presented aim to 
highlight the mutually constitutive nature of the multi-scale interactions at the heart of processes 
of woodfuel (and, by extension, wider energy) interventions. And finally, the discussion seeks to 
consider how best to demonstrate the value for policy of localising complex and changing political 
economies of woodfuel in the context of time, place and space.  
 
Following this introduction, the paper consists of three sections and a conclusion. Section two 
situates woodfuel dependence in a 20th century global/local political-economic context dominated 
by fossil fuels, establishing woodfuel as an integral part of Nigeria’s national ‘energy question’. In 
doing so, the discussion highlights some of the (in)direct consequences for woodfuel systems, of 
fossil fuel and other energy interventions. Section 3 explores the contextualization of woodfuel 
further, by looking at ‘silences’ around woodfuel in popular interaction; suggesting how these 
might be interpreted as both reflections of, and contributors to, negotiations of complex symbolic 
and material meanings at the heart of processes of social intercourse; and, finally, why these might 
be read in policy-relevant ways. In Section 4, the paper then responds to Harcharik’s (1995) 
challenge to rethink the historical association between woodfuel use and 
poverty/underdevelopment in two parts: first, by summarising a selection of historical and 
contemporary woodfuel interventions in Kano, and assessing how they may have informed received 
wisdom in regional and federal energy circles; and, second, by using the topical issue of energy 
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transitions as an illustration to highlight why it is imperative for policy interventions to be focused 
on real rather than generic woodfuel systems, networks and economies.  
 
2. Woodfuel Dependence in a Fossil Fuel Era: Re-framing the 'Energy Question'? 
Although it is still the case that some rich industrial economies consume significant quantities of 
woodfuel,3 much of the current attention devoted to its ‘sustainability’ has focused on the so-called 
developed world. These debates have been dominated as much by discussions about the impact of 
non-renewable fuel dependence for climate change and global warming (Freund and Kårstad, 
2007), as by conversations devoted to the economics of energy conservation and substitution 
(Lamb, 1995).4 At the same time, however, the politics of energy self-sufficiency and its links to 
national and regional security concerns constitute an integral part of this framing of the energy 
question, with both USA and UK strategic oil security plans, for example, identifying West African 
oil and natural gas reserves as important future supply sources (Abramovici, 2004; Keenan, 2004; 
Paillard, 2006).5 Nonetheless, even though high and volatile oil prices have often meant increased 
individual and household indebtedness, ‘inflated asset prices’ and balance of payment deficits, they 
have not yet recreated the inflationary crisis or accompanying global recession of the 1970s (Elliott, 
2005). According to some commentators, they do, however, represent a significant risk to future 
global economic growth and geopolitical stability (Long, 2005; Zelenka et al., 2005).  
 
In the global south, the impact of volatile, fluctuating oil prices has varied markedly between 
producer/exporter countries and import-dependent economies, leading to political economies of 
                                                          
3  Significant levels of woodfuel consumption have been reported in economies like Australia (Driscoll et 
al., 2000); Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands (Faaij, 2002); and France, Austria and Germany 
(Trossero, 2002). 
4  Freund and Kårstad’s (2007) book combines both these concerns in its title, Keeping the lights on: 
fossil fuels in the century of climate change.  
5 Some sources, for example, suggest that the USA is expected to import one quarter of its oil from the Gulf 
of Guinea nations by 2015. See http://westafricaoilwatch.org/the issues/conflict-stability/  
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energy which are arguably both prosaic and complex. In the case of Nigeria, energy is essential for 
economic growth, social development and a sustainable environment, as well as playing an 
important role in international diplomacy (Oyedepo, 2012). But while it is Africa’s largest crude 
oil exporter, and also boasts more than half of the continent’s domestic refining capacity, Nigeria 
still imports significant quantities of refined petroleum in an attempt to satisfy a large unmet 
domestic demand for cooking gas, kerosine and petrol. This deficit has been caused partly by the 
poor state of maintenance of local refineries, which have been forced to function at well below their 
installed capacity (Adesanya, Undated; Omeje, 2004), but partly also by a thriving illegal 
transborder trade in Nigerian kerosene and gas (Odihi, 2003). At the same time, and in addition to 
its role in region-wide ECOWAS initiatives such as ECOWAS Renewable Energy Facility (EREF) 
(ECOWAS/UEMOA, 2006), Nigeria is currently collaborating with Sao Tome and Principe in the 
exploration and development of shared oil reserves in their Joint Development Zone in the Gulf of 
Guinea under a treaty signed in 2001 (Brigaldino, 2005; Oduniyi, 2006). Furthermore, Nigeria also 
supplies petroleum products to Sierra Leone (with a non-operational local refinery recently 
acquired from Nigerian ownership), whose economy is, like most of its West African counterparts, 
entirely dependent on imports to meet its oil needs (CEMMATS, 2004).  
 
Not surprisingly, the energy question in Nigeria coalesces as much around debates concerning the 
need for wider political, constitutional and economic reform, as around narrower questions that 
concern policy preference, technical feasibility and consumer access and choice. For example, 
ordinary Nigerians have found it difficult to reconcile the harsh realities of increasingly expensive 
but notoriously unreliable supplies of refined petroleum products and electricity with reports of 
high-level corruption and irresponsible government disbursement of revenues from crude oil 
production (Odihi, 2003). At the same time, the country’s oil-producing states, which are as poorly 
served in modern energy as anywhere else in the federation, are demanding nearly twice the 13% 
share of national petroleum revenues they currently receive under existing federal resource 
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allocation arrangements. This is a case which local militants seem inclined to pursue using violent 
and disruptive means, including damaging pipelines and other installations, and kidnapping oil 
workers (Watts, 2004; 2007; Dowden, 2005; Omeje, 2004; USEIA, 2011). Significantly, in a recent 
restatement of the pressing need to pursue a sustainable national energy future, Oyedepo (2012) 
advocates efficiency in the use of fossil and other conventional energy resources, alongside an 
expanded interest in, and use of, renewable energy sources and technologies.  
 
Formulating the ‘energy question’ in Nigeria in such exclusively ‘modern’ (and mostly fossil) fuel 
terms might be justified, given that the 20th Century was widely considered the ‘fossil century’ 
(Monbiot, 2008). It may also be predictable, given petroleum’s contribution of 70% to federal 
income and 25% to Gross Domestic Product (Oyedepo, 2012). Indeed, in addition to its economic 
importance for attracting potential investors for industrial and manufacturing opportunities, a 
reliable, affordable and plentiful modern energy supply continues to be essential to modern-day 
living (Cline-Cole, 2006). Richard Dowden (2011) captures this well in the following exchange:  
 
‘During the election in April [2011] I was talking to a woman in Kaduna 
standing in the queue waiting to vote. I asked her “What are you voting for?” 
she replied “Power”. “What - political power?” I said. “No” she replied, 
“Electricity”’.  
 
Yet, this centrality to modern life and livelihoods notwithstanding, energy remains largely taken 
for granted, typically attracting attention only when supplies are threatened or interrupted (Freund 
and Kårstad, 2007). Indeed, less than a year after this reported exchange, the local and international 
press was full of reports of just such a potential disruption: 
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'This week [w/c 9/1/2012], a general strike has paralyzed much of Nigeria’s 
economy while anti-government protests have occurred in many of the country’s 
major cities. The protests were triggered by the federal government’s decision to 
remove a subsidy on fuel on Jan. 1. The ensuing rise in the cost of a liter of fuel, 
from approximately $0.45 to $0.94, dealt a powerful blow to most Nigerians, many 
of whom live on less than $2 a day. Some protesters, fearing for their economic 
survival, feel they have no choice but to take to the streets' (Thurston, 2012)  
 
And yet, nowhere is energy’s taken-for-granted status truer, perhaps, than in the case of woodfuel 
and other so-called ‘non-commercial’ energy sources. Although Nigeria recorded massive 
increases in commercial fuel consumption during the second half of the 20th century, leading to its 
more than 100 million citizens consuming a third of all commercial energy used in sub-Saharan 
Africa, Nigerians still depended on biomass for at least two-thirds of all energy consumed (USDoE, 
2004a; 2004b; USAEIA, 2011), and in excess of 95% of all household energy needs (IEA, 2001). 
Thus, some 85% of total energy consumption in West Africa as a whole is estimated to come from 
wood (FAO, 2002a), with Nigeria representing the single largest regional producer and consumer 
of woodfuel (Akinbami et al., 2001). According to some sources, daily consumption of woodfuel 
in Nigeria’s rural areas is estimated at 27.5 millon kg/day (Ogunsanwo and Ajala, 2002). In an 
attempt to better understand national consumption patterns, Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statistics 
undertook an analysis of the relationship between poverty levels and the quantity of fuelwood 
consumed by region (Table 1). The study suggested that there is a strong relationship between 
poverty and the use of woodfuel, except for the case of south-eastern Nigeria, where poverty rates 
were lower but a higher percentage of cooking wood was consumed. Poorer regions, such as 
northern Nigeria, tended to consume the most fuelwood (Zaku et. al, 2013).. 
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Table 1: Poverty rate and percent of wood as fuel source in Nigeria 
 
Region Poverty Rate 
(%) 
Percent of Wood as Fuel Source 
North-east 72.2 95.9 
North-west 71.2 95.3 
North-central 67.2 86.4 
South-west 43.0 54.9 
South-east 26.7 78.0 
South-south 35.1 72.7 
                                                                                Source: NBS (2007), Adapted from Zaku et al., 2013. 
 
Not surprisingly, the United States Department of Energy has noted that ‘Africa is the world's 
largest consumer of biomass energy (firewood, agricultural residues, animal wastes, and charcoal), 
calculated as a percentage of overall energy consumption’ (USDoE, 2003). Relatedly, Karekezi et 
al (2004) estimate that the share of biomass in total energy use in Africa will still be as high as 60% 
in 2020. Clearly, in both rural and urban West Africa, woodfuel is an integral part of the ‘energy 
question’, and not, as in many industrial economies, largely a novelty activity or lifestyle choice.  
For African countries, therefore, woodfuel is as much a question of national, regional and 
continental economic and environmental dynamics, as of individual and household livelihood 
security (CEMMATS, 2004; FMEN, 2001). And this is as true today as it was some three decades 
ago when ‘the role of firewood [wa]s so predominant that any realistic energy analysis [wa]s 
essentially a firewood analysis’ (Brown, 1980; see also Ikuponosi, 2004). Not surprisingly, the 
FAO (2005) is convinced that, globally, wood energy has an important role to play ‘in meeting 
international commitments on sustainable development, the Millennium Development Goals, and 
climate change’. 
  
At the same time, scarce and more expensive petroleum products have had both direct and indirect 
consequences for woodfuel systems. Higher petrol or diesel prices, for example, increase 
production and transportation costs and, ultimately, consumer prices for firewood and charcoal. 
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Thus more expensive kerosene or cooking gas often translates into increased use of, and greater 
spending on, cheaper woodfuel (MEMA, Undated). Indeed, a Nigerian newspaper report notes, in 
an unintentional reminder of one of the main driving forces behind the continuing policy interest 
in, and early justifications for, development intervention in woodfuel economies, that ‘the cost of 
kerosene [the most widely used petroleum product] has a direct impact on rural and urban poverty 
and [can] also account for environmental disasters through deforestation’ (Anon, 2005b). This dual 
nature of the energy question represents an intriguing paradox, one which is succinctly expressed 
in the cartoon making up Figure 2. It is also strongly reminiscent of van Sambeek’s (2007: 10) 
observation that ‘[t]he exact relation between energy and development and the many other factors 
that influence this relation is often complex and intractable’. Some of the varied manifestations of 
this relationship explored in more detail in subsequent sections of the paper bear witness to, and 
provide further support for, this observation.  
Figure 2: Independence Day – Our Economic Wahala 
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3. Woodfuel Silences: Symbolisms and Meanings? 
In energy policy arenas, the way in which woodfuel issues are discussed and framed is highly 
significant. Language, knowledge and discourse all play an instrumental role in shaping policy 
narratives and reinforcing the legitimacy of particular policy ‘problems’. In this respect, it can be 
argued that policy problems are not given, but rather are social constructions.  Equally important 
to the construction of these narratives, however, are ‘policy silences’ or the discussions that are 
absent from mainstream policy arenas.  Following the work of poststructuralist Carol Bacchi 
(1999), it becomes evident that an examination of what is not said is also important for 
understanding how mainstream thought is reinforced, and how normative frameworks for solving 
problems through policy are constructed. In short, it is how a ‘problem’ is constructed and 
represented that critically determines the ‘solutions’ that become available in policy, and this would 
appear to particularly be the case with respect to energy questions in Nigeria.  
 
Despite the continuing significance of fuelwood and/or charcoal in energy mixes at all geographic 
scales in Nigeria, detailed histories of woodfuel systems and/or their operators are few and far 
between. Where they do exist, the ‘ordinariness’ of the stories they relate is striking, notably the 
non-elite origins of their main characters, some of whom have reportedly gone on to successful 
careers in business and politics. There is thus nothing comparable, in fuelwood and charcoal terms, 
to the saturation press coverage which accompanied announcements of planned increases in the 
domestic price of petroleum products in Nigeria in 2003, 2005 and 2012; and, subsequently, the 
predictable protests which the announcements generated (Bello, 2005; Komolafe et al., 2005; 
Anon., 2005a).  Nor is the subject of woodfuel mentioned in popular songs by local artists, either 
when these represent coruscating critiques of the political leadership and body politic or, indeed, 
when they explicitly ridicule and roundly condemn the poor performance of public utilities, 
including energy/power agencies. 
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Such ‘selective’ silence is suggestive, in addition to mirroring the privileging of modern energy 
within national policy and popular debates (Ikuponosi, 2004). Put differently, fuelwood and 
charcoal are livelihood products which seem to merit little or no unsolicited comment in quotidian 
interaction. This may be particularly the case with inhabitants living in relatively well-provisioned 
cities who have traditionally also enjoyed much greater access to electricity (however unreliable) 
and kerosene than their rural counterparts. In such a context, not only do electricity, kerosene and 
gas attract interest in a way which firewood and charcoal do not, but urban supply problems, for 
example, attract press coverage in a media which remains largely silent about corresponding 
difficulties in rural areas (Odihi, 2003). There is thus little or no history of woodfuel protests to 
rival those which accompanied steep increases in the price of foodstuffs in the 1980s-1990s, and 
more recently in 2007/2008, for example. Nor is there much to suggest that a continuing rise in the 
long-term upward trend in the real price of woodfuel would, as has been claimed for petroleum 
products in Nigeria, either risk ‘provok[ing] a revolution’ (Bello, 2005), or be ‘rejected by various 
groups including the House[s] of Representatives, labour unions, civil society groups and other 
individuals’ (Anon, 2005a).   
 
Indeed, on the rare occasion of a ‘firewood strike’ in northern Nigeria in 1992, the action in question 
was not instigated, as one would have expected, by disgruntled consumers. Instead, it was organised 
by urban-based dealers who, in protest of the constant official harassment of the drivers of their 
long-distance delivery trucks, withheld supplies to Katsina Town in protest (Cline-Cole, 1998). 
Most significant for present purposes, however, was that the firewood dealers launched their protest 
in the middle of a kerosene and gas shortage, when it was believed it would have the greatest 
cumulative impact and public exposure. Indeed, Odihi’s (2003) detailed description of the 
disruptive effect of fossil fuel shortages across northern Nigeria in the mid-1990s provides 
confirmation of the strategic awareness demonstrated by the Katsina firewood dealers. Similarly, 
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official proposals during the late-1980s and early-1990s were designed to achieve large-scale 
spatial reorganisation of the urban woodfuel trade in Kano as part of wider – and controversial – 
environmental sanitation initiatives which were themselves integral components of a state-
sponsored War Against Indiscipline (Stock 1988). 
 
However, these initiatives threatened the survival of a significant number of small-scale wood 
enterprises in Yanawaki fuelwood depot, Kano’s largest depot at the time (Cline-Cole, 1989). This 
saw the elected president of the state-wide Kano Firewood Sellers Development Association 
seriously considering the possibility of running for elective (local metropolitan government) office, 
in a search for a public platform to press his association’s case for fair treatment of its members at 
the hands of metropolitan planning authority officials and state environmental quality enforcement 
inspectors. Despite the fact that the firewood profession ‘performed an invaluable service to the 
community at large’, the president insisted on several occasions during interviews and 
conversations, ‘our commoner status means that we are never considered as important, or treated 
with the same consideration, as the “big men” dealers in petrol, kerosene and gas’ (Cline-Cole 
1989). Not surprisingly, Kano wood sellers continued to reiterate what they still perceive as the 
‘lowly’ status of their trade as recently as November 2012, insisting that they remained ‘poor’ 
people trying to make a living under increasingly difficult circumstances. Were this not the case, 
according to one seller, ‘my wives would be cooking with kerosene and gas [like rich people] not 
firewood’ (personal communication, fuelwood seller, Yanawaki Fuelwood Depot, November 
2012).  
 
Anecdotes of this kind notwithstanding, woodfuel crisis narratives and discourses dating to the 
1970s and earlier, but continually reworked in the years since, often misinterpret the woodfuel 
sector’s capacity for self-effacement as an inability on the part of its practitioners to both articulate 
and respond to felt needs. These narratives did not just denounce perceived neglect by policy, 
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research and funding interests. They also assumed responsibility for speaking on behalf of 
woodfuel users, often misrepresenting the nature, extent and severity of existing woodfuel 
situations in the process. This was even the case when these involved firewood and charcoal 
circulating in considerably more user- and producer-friendly ways than, say, electricity and cooking 
gas. And, while there are many and varied reports of localised difficulties with affordability and/or 
availability of woodfuels in both urban and rural areas, there is also plenty of evidence of adaptive 
capability. This is the case not only among consumers, but also, and equally significantly, among 
producers, transporters and sellers. Such adaptation has sometimes involved the use of illegal 
tactics like poaching and intimidation of forest guards, and environmentally undesirable methods, 
such as the seemingly indiscriminate use of power saws (Alabe, 1996; Alieu, 2001; Odihi, 2003).  
 
Nonetheless, the dominant concern with respect to kerosene and cooking gas during the difficult 
Structural Adjustment era of the mid-1980s was the scarcity and vastly-increased cost of these 
fuels. In contrast, explanations of a corresponding, even expanded, popularity of woodfuel across 
the entire socio-economic spectrum over the same period emphasise the latter’s constant 
availability, relative affordability and widespread cultural acceptability. Furthermore, the reported 
attraction of woodfuel also included a perceived freedom from the irritation of price-fixing, as well 
as an absence of risk associated with sharp practices like the adulteration of kerosene and the sale 
of partially refilled cooking gas cylinders at the exorbitant black market prices demanded for full 
cylinders (Odihi, 2003; see also Alieu, 2001). Against this background, one in which firewood and 
charcoal were, as always, both first and last resort fuels, can woodfuel production and distribution 
systems be seen justifiably as victims of their own success, whose gloss is consistently tarnished 
by a widespread and insistent focus on perceived negative socio-environmental consequences of 
their organisation and functioning? Furthermore, can the seeming lack of popular representations 
of (discourses on) woodfuel be interpreted as a peculiar case of a silence born of relative consumer 
satisfaction, notably when compared to modern fuels? Finally, could this silence be breeding 
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contempt among well-meaning but sometimes ill-informed socio-economic planners, policy 
makers and environmental managers engaged in the continuing re(de)fining of energy policy and 
practice?  
 
In any case, much of the foregoing points to both the site- and situation-specific nature of woodfuel 
as an energy option, and the diversity of reasons which influence its adoption and use (Horgan, 
2002).  In this context, it is worth noting the relevance of related notions of ‘image’ or ‘appearance’ 
for understanding woodfuel relations in northern Nigeria, where carefully and consistently 
scrutinised status markers, including choice and use of domestic fuel, are key to the complex 
negotiation of social intercourse. Thus, to take one example, embarrassed by their inability to 
‘maintain face’ by using (modern) cooking fuels befitting their status, upper middle- and some 
upper-income earners in the region deliberately under-report the extent of their dependence on 
woodfuel. This is the case even while newly promoted lower-middle income earners lament the 
current absence of energy perks like subsidised domestic electric and gas appliances and energy 
supplies, which formerly came with elevation to the ranks of ‘senior staff’ (Odihi, 2003). Here, as 
elsewhere, woodfuel’s ‘silent ubiquity’ is pregnant with interpretive possibilities, including 
seeming support for Harcharik’s (1995) call to rethink the historical (and generally unqualified) 
association between woodfuel use and poverty/underdevelopment. To what extent have such 
insights informed received wisdom in energy circles?  And how, if at all, can they be read in policy-
relevant ways with particular reference to Kano and the rest of northern Nigeria?  
 
4. ‘Reading’ Policy implications of/from Woodfuel Silences?  
 
4.1 Woodfuel Discourses and Policy Interventions 
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While debates around the nexus between fuelwood use and environmental change in northern 
Nigeria have a long and rich history dating back to the colonial era (e.g. Stebbing, 1935, 1937), it 
was really during the 1970s that the so-called ‘fuelwood crisis’ increasingly began to receive 
international policy attention.  With the ‘oil boom’ years came exceptional rates of urban expansion 
in Nigeria, as the bias in state spending towards major cities such as Kano was dramatically 
expressed through a proliferation of urban construction and major infrastructural projects.  As the 
physical size of Kano expanded at an unprecedented pace, and the surrounding rural periphery 
became integrated into the urban system, concerns about the over-exploitation of the city’s 
fuelwood hinterland returned to centre stage.  Apocalyptic images of environmental collapse were 
further perpetuated by fears that the quadrupling of crude petroleum prices would lead to an 
unsustainable surge in demand for fuelwood, and to a lesser extent charcoal, as they became the 
only affordable energy substitutes for financially unobtainable – and frequently scarce – petroleum-
based fuels.  
 
During this period, perhaps the most immediate and direct form of state intervention in the 
fuelwood sector transpired in an attempt to stimulate wood supplies through ‘better’ environmental 
conservation and forestry management practices. Also at this time, severe droughts across the Sahel 
were receiving international media coverage, which served to further bolster a growing 
‘desertification industry’, both within Africa and abroad. In Nigeria, this led to government 
proposals for a continuous shelterbelt stretching across northern Nigeria from Sokoto to Lake Chad 
(Cline-Cole, 1998) – a remedy that was strangely reminiscent of the epic solutions to degradation 
proposed by colonial foresters during the 1930s (Stebbing, 1935).  In the second half of the 1970s, 
this was followed by a massive injection of government funds into environmental forestry 
initiatives, including the promotion of shelterbelts, woodlots, farm-tree planting and rural 
afforestation programmes (Hyman, 1993). Throughout the 1980s, these projects were carried out 
by a host of newly created government agencies (e.g. KNARDA, NEAZDP, etc.) and locally active 
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environmental NGOs (e.g. NEST, etc.), many of which continue to wield considerable influence 
today. Alongside these organisations, both national and international resources were channelled 
into energy research centres, experimental energy programmes and training centres for energy 
specialists (Cline-Cole, 2006). More recently, energy policy structures, processes and regulatory 
instruments have all benefited from sustained attention, to go along with long-established economic 
incentives of subsidies, pricing, etc. (Sambo 2005; 2009).  
 
At the same time, the other main policy response to the fuelwood crisis was an attempt to reduce 
demand for biomass energy, primarily through the adoption of non-wood energy substitutes and 
the promotion of more ‘modern’ and renewable fuel sources.  State responses to the situation were 
motivated by a perceived need for energy conservation, as widespread fears emerged that rising 
petroleum prices and imminent shortages would drive the demand for fuelwood even higher.  In 
addition, however, particularly during the 1970s when petro-dollars were being heavily reinvested 
in urban and infrastructural development and a drive towards ‘modernisation’, there was also a 
strong underlying belief that traditional biomass fuel options were ‘primitive’ and undesirable. It 
was widely assumed that with modernisation would come a ‘trickle-down’ effect that would raise 
levels of income and improve the quality of life for the masses, allowing them to partake in an 
energy transition that would take them away from undesirable biomass energy options. Thus, even 
though urban and regional development plans from this era routinely included peri-urban and rural 
plantations and woodlots to meet rising fuelwood and pole demands in their designs, these were 
rarely, if ever, actually established (Trevallion et al, 1963). Coincidentally, new petro-dollar funded 
interstate roads extended the firewood catchments of growing cities like Kano into new, often 
cheaper, and increasingly distant supply zones, which private traders and transporters exploited to 
satisfy a growing and concentrated demand.   
 
  
19 
 
In this context, a strongly held ‘modernist’ belief has largely endured to this day and ties in closely 
with present-day notions of the ‘energy ladder’, a well-known model used by resource economists 
to predict how households will advance to more ‘sophisticated’ domestic fuels as economic 
conditions improve.  While this model appears to have gained increasing currency in policy circles 
in recent years – underpinning the logic of many energy pricing policies – fuel substitution and 
subsequent movements upwards or downwards on the preference ladder are complex processes, the 
mechanics of which are poorly understood.  While in the Kano region there is certainly some 
evidence to suggest that domestic fuel decision-making is influenced by price, availability and 
household characteristics (see, for example, Maconachie et al., 2009), the relationship is far from 
clear (Dang, 1993).  As the price of crude oil soared in recent years, household energy portfolios 
adjusted in response, as kerosene and petroleum-based energy sources became unobtainable.  It is 
thus apparent that individuals exercise trade-offs as they move up and down the energy ladder and 
adjust their energy mix accordingly.  This is perhaps most readily seen in the rise in charcoal use 
in Kano since 2012, a domestic fuel that has been widely used in the South of the country for many 
years.  However, the full impacts of the sharp decline in oil prices between July 2014 and January 
2015 are yet to be known.  As the price of fossil fuel products once again becomes more affordable 
for many Nigerians, it is likely that this will influence the preference and availability of other 
domestic energy products. 
 
As Woodwell (2002) notes, however, there has been little research that has convincingly linked the 
price of fuelwood to the demand for fuelwood in sub-Saharan Africa.  In practice, as the price of 
fuelwood rises, what also tends to happen is that more ‘sophisticated’ energy sources (e.g. kerosene 
or natural gas) become more cost-competitive.  Under such conditions, it has been pointed out that 
fuel-switching is, in fact, most likely more directly responsive to income levels (Woodwell, 2002).  
Some observers have therefore proposed that to achieve the highest impact on people’s choice of 
fuels, increases in income should also be accompanied by increases in the price of fuelwood and 
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charcoal (Woodwell, 2002).  As such, one rather controversial policy response aimed at promoting 
alternative fuels has been to tax wood harvest from the hinterlands. Although, in theory, proponents 
argue that raising the price of fuelwood through regulations and harvest taxes should ensure that 
there is a more efficient and sustainable use of forests (Hyman 1993), in the process, the reality is 
that many people would be priced or regulated out of the domestic energy market.  For those living 
in chronic poverty, an already desperate situation could become even worse.  
 
Over the last 40 years, technological modernisation has thus been an important undercurrent that 
has shaped energy policy-making in Nigeria.  At various points in time since the 1970s, there have 
been drives towards the promotion of more advanced alternative, renewable energy resources – 
including hydroelectricity and solar power – and Nigerian policy makers have routinely subsidised 
the price of ‘modern’ fuels in an effort to make them more accessible to the wider populace. But, 
at the same time, there has also been a strong realisation that fuelwood demand is unlikely to 
subside in the near future.  Indeed, wood and charcoal still remain the only realistic option for the 
majority of households in and around Kano, as across large parts of the rest of Nigeria, despite their 
failure to benefit from direct state subsidy.   
 
As such, one recent response by NGOs and environmental agencies has been to try and reduce 
woodfuel use through the promotion of improved stove efficiency. In theory, the higher the 
technical efficiency of a stove, the less fuel will be consumed during cooking – and therefore the 
less expensive it will be to operate.  However, one problem that has arisen is that the initial cost of 
purchasing an improved efficiency stove – an alternative that is unsubsidised by the government – 
is still out of reach for most people.  Moreover, for those who can afford the initial cost, studies 
suggest that because more efficient stoves are less expensive to operate (both in monetary terms 
and in time spent collecting wood), people tend to cook more often when they are using them (Zein-
Elabdin, 1997; Jones, 1988).  This may help to explain why donor efforts to reduce fuelwood use 
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by promoting the distribution of ‘improved’ woodstoves have to date not produced significant 
reductions in fuelwood use. Nonetheless, it is a response which, like the others identified in this 
section, continues to have significant policy purchase in the contemporary Kano and wider northern 
Nigerian contexts.  
 
In policy terms then, and based on the foregoing, much intervention would appear to: (i) reflect a 
preoccupation with ‘modern’ energy concerns; (ii) re-act to perceived threats to the sustainability 
of regional environment and livelihoods supposedly posed by woodfuel production and use, rather 
than adopt a pro-active approach to fuelwood policy and planning; and (iii) seek to control access 
to, and reduce consumption of fuelwood and other biomass fuels, in preference to increasing or 
diversifying their supplies. In our view, this reflects a neglect of the role of situatedness, context 
and complexity in woodfuel systems, relations and practices in their own right. A potential 
corrective here might be an appreciation of the existence and significance of the ‘background noise’ 
associated with woodfuel silences identified earlier and, indeed, what it might contribute to more 
informed policy intervention.   
 
4.2 Fuel Transitions and Policy Implications 
In both policy circles and discourse, biodiversity, conservation and natural resources issues are 
accorded prominence in drought-desertification debates in northern Nigeria, as is the recognition 
of the continuing centrality of woodfuel and wider energy questions to these and broader 
development and poverty reduction debates. Nigeria’s National Energy Policy (NEP), for example, 
reflects both a desperation to attract investment funds and a determination to facilitate the 
expansion of local traditional and renewable energy. In addition, however, NEP also demonstrates 
that policy makers are confronted with the extremely difficult proposition of reforming energy 
markets, while ensuring the latters’ capacity to maintain a ‘supply [of] energy at economically 
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favourable cost in the long term’ (FMEN, 2001: 21). The latter is unlikely to be achieved without 
detailed consideration of, and commitment to, an energy mix to include woodfuel in its various 
forms. Indeed, policy and allied official statements like NEP, and the Electric Sector Reform Bill, 
are instructive in this respect (FMEN, 2001; Ikuponosi, 2004):  
(i) they recognise that woodfuel markets (continue to) cater to the cooking fuel 
requirements of the vast majority of the country’s rural and some of its (mostly ‘poor’ 
or ‘low income’) urban households; and 
(ii) they appear convinced that firewood/charcoal networks, which are assumed to operate 
excessively high consumer prices, are in urgent need of regulation and improvement, 
including the wider adoption of improved biomass technology to enhance the 
efficiency of woody biomass production and use, and, ultimately, of substitution by 
‘modern’ energy alternatives. 
 
This might appear, at first glance, to augur well for woodfuel prospects. However, on closer 
inspection, the policies and declarations in question are characterised by a paucity of detailed 
official knowledge of, as well as a noticeable seeming lack of genuine curiosity about, the structure 
and functioning of local rather than generic woodfuel markets and related networks (Ikuponosi, 
2004). Not surprisingly, they continue a long tradition of representing poverty as the dominant, 
frequently sole, driving force behind the continued and even expanding use of fuelwood, charcoal 
and other biomass fuels (cf FAO, 2005; Lamb, 1995). In tracing the contours of this woodfuel-
poverty link, Arnold et al. (2003: 24) note that the widespread dependence of poor people on 
woodfuel for cooking and heating is effectively dependence on a low density – and therefore 
inefficient – fuel which, because it is more often than not used in ‘thermally inefficient devices’, 
translates into high real energy costs. Moreover, they argue that this in turn acts as ‘an important 
constraint to livelihood enhancement and broader economic improvement’. Taken together with its 
high real cost, they conclude that this helps to explain the attraction for energy policies, of 
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encouraging woodfuel consumers to shift to more efficient fuels or devices. It is, in fact, this 
discourse which Figure 2 reproduces and summarises so trenchantly, and which is itself an 
indication that the breadth of its appeal extends well beyond the policy and planning arenas. 
 
The notion of such an energy transition rests, as we have already seen, squarely on the assumption 
that as individuals, families and countries become wealthier, they are more likely to trade up from 
low(er) value to high(er) value fuels (usually from wood and charcoal to kerosene, cooking gas and 
electricity). Significantly, Martinez-Alier (2005) has referred to this as a ‘“natural” and universal 
hierarchy in the use of domestic fuel’. However, this relationship is mediated by a host of factors 
including: housing quality, design, and levels and intensity of occupancy; fuel preference and 
availability; household size, structure and organisation; and the distribution of responsibility for 
domestic tasks, including cooking and fuel collection or purchase, within the household (Cline-
Cole, 1989). Furthermore, as the pace of the transition is influenced by energy pricing and policy 
which may either accelerate or slow it down, most commonly through subsidising the price of 
favoured fuels and thereby promoting their use at the expense of others, Martinez-Alier (2005) 
argues that contrary to World Bank objections to energy subsidies in principle, such subsidies are 
important in responding to the needs of both poor people and the environment. Work by Cline-Cole 
(1989) and Odihi (2003) is instructive here, particularly in providing a wider regional context for 
situating earlier observations about Kano’s ‘energy ladder’ (see Section 4.1). First, they describe 
the ‘class-based’ structure or ‘stratified’ nature of domestic cooking fuel consumption up to the 
1980s (Cline-Cole) and 1990s (Odihi) in northern Nigeria: low income households overwhelmingly 
consumed woodfuel but also some kerosene; middle income earners consumed more modern 
energy than woodfuel; high income earners represented the single most important group of modern 
energy consumers, although they did also consume woodfuel. They then explain this partly with 
reference to the relative affordability and availability of different fuels; and partly by way of policy 
initiatives favouring the once common practice of providing ‘senior staff’ employees in both the 
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private and public sectors with subsidised accommodation, which came furnished with modern 
appliances like air conditioners and kerosene stoves, electric and/or gas cookers and, where 
appropriate, gas cylinders.  
 
Yet, as both authors also note, and as Section 4.1 suggests, dependence on woodfuel is not simply 
a temporary phase in a unidirectional energy transition occurring as part of complex long-run 
processes of socio-economic transformation. Energy transitions are not unidirectional; they are 
capable of being reversed. Regular or periodic disruptions to, or frequent increases in the price of, 
electricity, kerosene and gas supplies, for example, encourage individuals and households to ‘trade 
down’ to either cheaper or more readily available woodfuel, for shorter or longer periods of time. 
However, it is worth remembering too that increased petroleum or diesel prices often also result in 
increased consumer prices for firewood and charcoal (through increased transportation and other 
costs). Thus Maconachie et al (2009) have demonstrated how (increasingly) expensive kerosene, 
gas or electric stoves have left many Kano consumers with little choice but to resort to the use of 
cheap wood or charcoal stoves and/or the 3-stone fireplace. Indeed, this reverse switch has also 
been in response to an increase in fossil fuel prices during the decade of the 1990s, even though a 
residual state subsidy on kerosene ensured its continued use, particularly for lighting. 
Consequently, large numbers of households which consumed kerosene and gas for cooking during 
the 1980s, have subsequently switched to wood and charcoal. Similarly, Odihi (2003) has described 
in some detail how, more generally, the ‘unfavourable socio-economic conditions’ which 
accompanied Structural Adjustment and economic reform in Nigeria – mass retrenchment and 
unemployment, low wages, irregular payment and non-payment of salaries, and sharply increased 
food prices – impacted on regional urban energy use. This had a particularly profound impact on 
middle income households in urban areas of the northern drylands, which formerly consumed 
kerosene, gas and electricity but subsequently switched to firewood. Among the poor and low 
income earners, Structural Adjustment Programmes reinforced dependence on fuelwood (Cline-
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Cole, 1989). Indeed, as Odihi (2003) has observed, after 1988 firewood became the most affordable 
domestic fuel, even if its price increased in tandem with (and, in some cases, was driven by) that 
of alternative fuels.  
 
There is, therefore, a strong case for seeing the much-resisted 2012 increases in the price of 
petroleum products in Nigeria (see Section 2) as representing some of the most recent 
manifestations of energy pricing policies which had their origins in the 1980s and even earlier. 
Indeed, an oft-repeated complaint of pro-subsidy protesters concerned the perceived ‘remoteness’ 
of the lives of politicians and the policy-making classes from the everyday existences of ordinary 
people. Consequently, for protesters, these ‘elites’ are unable to understand the complexities of 
household or domestic energy economies and, within these, the significance and value of the 
residual fuel subsidies which were under threat.   
 
Much of this is a useful reminder of the abiding wisdom in Karakezi et al’s (2004) observation, 
that two of the most pressing needs to be addressed in post-Adjustment national, regional and 
continental African economies are raising incomes and alleviating poverty. Indeed, in seeming 
support, Nigeria’s National Energy Policy notes that economic and development strategies adopted 
in pursuit of such goals 'must focus on initiatives that will increase and diversify supplies – 
including alternative and renewable energy – and use existing resources more efficiently' (FMEN, 
2001). However, on the assumption that woodfuel will remain price-competitive for the foreseeable 
future, given current socio-economic conditions and energy pricing policies, addressing these needs 
must involve making individual and group livelihoods more generally secure. It follows from this 
that in Kano and the rest of northern Nigeria, such a process will need to ensure – among other 
initiatives – that key natural capitals (e.g. forest, farm and woodland resources) which support 
woodfuel-based livelihood activity, are more accessible, diversified and sustainable. Nonetheless, 
dominant policy discourses continue to privilege new and renewable energy interventions, while 
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failing to reflect critically on the historical association between woodfuel use and 
poverty/underdevelopment (Harcharik, 1995), even as they restate a commitment to poverty 
reduction, livelihood security and the evolving post-2015 SDG agenda.   
 
And yet, two independent assessments of the global prospects of woodfuel, offered a quarter of a 
century apart, arrived at the common conclusion that a wood energy future built on an informed 
reading of history and a detailed understanding of the present can be eminently suitable, maybe 
even desirable, in the right circumstances and context. The first was advanced by British 
geographer W. B. Morgan (1980), and formulated against a combined backdrop of the oil crises of 
the 1970s, the discovery of the so-called ‘other’ energy or firewood crisis, and the promotion of 
renewable energy substitutes and improved energy technologies. The other is credited to an 
anonymous forester, who was addressing the FAO’s governing body for forestry in early 2005. 
Against a background of a long period of competitive woodfuel prices and unreliable modern 
energy supplies, his vision was formulated in the context of an international forestry establishment 
seeking to foster commitment to sustainable forestry management, the achievement of the MDGs 
and the reframing of derived wood energy as an economically viable, technologically feasible and 
environmentally benign substitute to fossil fuels (Anon 2005c). Significantly, however, while both 
assessments arrive at roughly the same conclusion, they do so from radically different starting 
points, via separate routes, and for diametrically opposite reasons. 
 
Thus although both visions are justified on grounds of (varied) readings of the role of fossil fuels 
in (local) energy transitions, there is little agreement over the exact dynamics, composition and 
content of the respective woodfuel futures envisaged. The forester’s vision favours a truncated 
energy transition which largely obviates the need for an intermediary fossil fuel phase in the shift 
from direct (firewood, charcoal, etc.) to derived (biofuel, biogas, etc.) woodfuel dependence. In 
contrast, Morgan’s alternative woodfuel future revolves around the notion that, along with the early 
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adoption of new and renewable sources of energy, an intensified dependence on direct woodfuel 
could act to limit, and maybe even prevent or stall, a nascent transition away from such fuels and 
in favour of modern or renewable replacements in the first place. While these visions recall the 
complexity, diversity and dynamism characterising discourses of transition in general, the specifics 
of the Kano and wider northern Nigeria transitions highlight the need to localise such discourses in 
space, place and time – notably within complex and changing regional, national and global political 
economies and ecologies of energy in which extra-local influences impact on local policy and 
practice and are impacted in return.  
 
As Ikuponosi (2004: 3) has perceptively noted, ‘[r]enewable [e]nergy has been talked about for 
more than thirty years while fossil fuels have increased in use and declined in supply’. Similarly, 
fuelwood has neither lost prominence nor been ‘transitioned’ out of existence by the increased use 
and/or popularity of either fossil or renewable fuels, and/or the sheer force of (stated) policy hope 
and aspiration if not (implementation) will. Indeed, fuelwood has increased both in use and supply 
in Kano as, in a development reminiscent of Morgan’s woodfuel future or vision, has charcoal, 
which has not typically featured in the (domestic) energy mix of Kano residents until recently. 
Here, there is much to suggest that energy policy and other interventions in Kano and the northern 
drylands (as elsewhere in and outside Nigeria) would do well to start by interrogating what might 
be described as ‘first principles’ (understood as including any and all relevant ‘pregnant silences’).    
 
5. Conclusion 
International policy concern with the impact of sharply-increased crude oil prices on the poor in 
Africa and elsewhere propelled the so-called ‘firewood crisis’ to prominence, starting in the 1970s. 
The response to this recognition of the significance of woodfuels for both livelihoods and 
regional/national economies – even in major oil exporters like Nigeria – was the appearance of a 
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wide range of technical recommendations for reducing woodfuel demand in the short term, and 
policy proposals for increasing sustainable supplies over the long term. However, many of these 
remain largely unimplemented or are still at an experimental stage in northern Nigeria. In this 
context, fossil fuels continue to dominate commercial energy consumption despite long-standing 
proposals for reducing global and local dependence on fossil and other non-renewable fuels, and 
expectations of widespread energy transitions to modern fuels notwithstanding, woodfuel continues 
to dominate domestic energy consumption.  
 
Recent government policy preference for a reduction of state subsidy on petroleum products has 
once again elevated energy questions to prominence in a manner reminiscent of various periods 
during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.  It has also given added impetus to on-going debates on the 
role of energy in poverty reduction and sustainable development, as well as in countering global 
warming and climate change. In turn, the perceived desirability of reducing reliance on both fossil 
fuels and fuelwood is once again well and truly to the fore, with derived woodfuel a favoured 
substitute candidate, in some international energy and related policy circles, including national 
policy declarations like Nigeria’s NEP. At the same time, much energy intervention is reactive 
rather than proactive; while the primary purpose of fuelwood planning and policy appears to be to 
restrict access to, and reduce consumption of fuelwood, instead of increasing or diversifying 
supplies in a way designed to make them sustainable over the long term. This raises questions about 
whether and to what extent such interventions reflect a desire to address woodfuel in its own right, 
rather than as an unintended and/or unpredictable outcome of other ‘higher priority’ energy-
environment interventions. 
 
Thus in preference to the compilation of a catalogue of (wood) energy interventions per se, this 
paper has adopted the selective critique of some foundational assumptions about the energy–
poverty–development matrix to argue for (i) the role of situatedness and context to be appreciated 
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in (wood) energy circles and acted upon during woodfuel interventions, and (ii) for these to be 
considered as relevant or important as the content and intended outcomes of these interventions. In 
doing so, we have suggested that energy interventions are the outcome of complex and diverse 
processes of resistance, negotiation and contestation, often with unintended consequences for both 
nature and society. In turn, as with development interventions more broadly, the potential of energy 
interventions to achieve desired outcomes depends, albeit partly, on the extent to which they are 
based on either ‘ideological fantasy’ or a careful and discriminating reading of particular political 
economic and historical realities (Cramer, 2006). Clearly, the (wood) energy interventions in Kano 
and the wider northern Nigerian region highlighted in this paper cannot justifiably be described 
simply as products of ideological fantasy. But likewise, they have equally not always been based 
on a sufficiently sympathetic interpretation, for energy intervention, of relevant characteristics of 
dryland economies, societies and historical experience.    
 
Informed by this belief, therefore, this paper has set out a case for interventions to be at the very 
least as embedded in local and regional political/economic and social/cultural contexts, as they are 
technocratic in design and transformative in intent. The case advanced is deliberately partial in its 
privileging of context of intervention over structure and process of the latter’s formulation and 
implementation. Yet, this is not to downplay the significance of the multi-scale interactions at the 
heart of such structures and processes. Rather, it is to demonstrate, in addition, the potential value 
for policy of localising complex and changing social/cultural economies of woodfuel in the context 
of time, place and space. 
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